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Comments
AGENCY-ABANDONMENT AND RE-ENTRY

In the case of Pesot v. Yanda,1 the alleged servant, Yanda, habitually used
an automobile in his duty of collecting insurance premiums for his employer.
On the morning in question, prior to reporting for work at his employer's office,
he first took his wife in the opposite direction to her place of employment.

1. 344 Mo. 338, 126 S. W. (2d) 240 (1939).
(331)
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The court held that he had, in so doing, completely departed from his duty and
had not resumed it when the accident occurred, although at that time the servant
had left his wife and was proceeding directly toward the office. The court stated
that a servant who had abandoned his employment did not re-enter that employment again until he had reached the point from which his departure took place,
or a corresponding place, some place where in the performance of his duty he
should be. In so deciding, the court necessarily decided that the servant's
deviation of thirteen or fourteen blocks in order to take his wife to work was
an abandonment of his employment.
For the legal historian there are few subjects more interesting and few
more controversial than the liability of a master for the torts of his servant.
The doctrine of respondeat superior has passed through many stages-from the
time the master was liable for all of the acts of his servant, through the period
when he was liable only for those he had commanded, to the present, when,
according to current formula, he is liable only for those committed by the servant
"within the scope of his employment." 2 Not all of his acts, even at the place and
during the period of his employment, are within the "scope" of the employment.
In other words, the word "scope" is a word expressive of the result of liability
or non-liability. It is a conclusion, not a reason. If the servant takes a side
trip of unusual proportions he may be said to be on a "frolic of his own"--outside
his "scope" of employment-whereas if he merely goes a roundabout way in
order to stop by his mother's home to deliver some sugar bought at a near-by sale,
the conclusion reached may be that he is on a mere "detour" and within the scope
4
of his employment.
Obviously the language fails to help us. Why is the one trip a frolic of his
own and the other a mere detour? In order to establish this differentiation it is
necessary to consider the reasons behind the so-called "rule" of respondeat
superior.
Various reasons have been advanced for the development of the vicarious
liability doctrine. Holmes contended that it was an outgrowth of the early
family law, and that a fiction of identity (that within the scope of the agency
master and servant are one) was built as a consequence of the early decisions,
which fiction persists today.5 Other bases for the doctrine have been advanced,
among which are the following: control, profit, revenge, carefulness and choice,
identification, evidence, indulgence, danger, and satisfaction.0 A social and

2. The studies of Holmes, Wigmore, Pollock and Maitland, and Baty, among
others, trace the history of the doctrine from early times. See Holmes, Agency
(1891) 4 HARV. L. REV. 345; (1891) 5 id. at 1; Wigmore, Responsibility for
Tortious Acts: Its History (1894) 7 HARv. L. REv.315, 383, 441; 2 POLLOCK AND
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1911) 533; BATY, VICARIOUS
LIBnILT (1916). See also RESTAThMENT, AGENCY, EXPLANATOY NOTES (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1930) § 470.
3. The classic phrase is that of Parke, B., in Joel v. Morison, 6 C. & P. 501
(1834).
4. Edwards v. Earnest, 208 Ala. 539, 94 So. 598 (1922).
5. Holmes, Agency (1891) 4 HARv. L. REV. 345.
6. BATY, VICARIOUS LIAnILTu (1916) 148.
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economic justification has also been suggested, namely, that it would seem to be
socially expedient to spread among a large group of the community those losses
which experience has taught are a necessary incident to every business. When
such loss is thrown on the employer, he can, by means of insurance and increased
prices, spread the loss through the community far better than can the employee.7
Or expressed in another way: "When (the master) bears the burden of (his
servant's) torts, even when he is himself without fault, it is because in a social
distribution of profit and loss, the balance of least disturbance seems thereby
best to be obtained."8 Nor must it be overlooked that it is probably more than a
mere coincidence that the master is usually better able to pay the injured plaintiff
than the tort feasor himself, the servant.
Some analogy may be drawn between workmen's compensation and the doctrine of respondeat superior. Both, it has been said, were a modern reaction
against mid-Victorian individualism. 9 In both liability without "fault" is assessed
against the employer. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of respondeat superior
is occasionally attacked upon this latter ground that it does in fact impose liability
without fault. Yet the force of this argument is greatly weakened by the many
instances in which liability without fault is assessed in modern law,O to say
nothing of the inherent vagueness in the term "fault" as so used. The analogy,
if such there is, lies in the fact that the various workmen's compensation acts and
the modern doctrine of the master's liability for the uncommanded acts of his
servant both recognize the fact that the conduct of business today imposes risks
upon the public and the workmen themselves which the industry itself should
assume as an incident of the business.
The current formula is, then, that the master is liable for. the tortious acts
of his servant who is acting in the scope of his employment.11 Being within such
scope, what acts take the servant without the scope of his employment? What
further acts are necessary to effectuate a re-entry into that employment? It is
the purpose of this note to make a suggestion as to a possible answer to these
questions.
The tests used to define the line of demarcation between acts within the
scope of employment and those without have been varied. One much-used test
deals with the motive of the servant. It is said that though he may be engaged
on an errand of his own, constituting some slight departure from the ordered
route at the time of the accident, if his motive is to carry out his master's
business, the master will be liable for his negligent conduct.1 2 But thus phrased,
the test leaves open the question as to the degree of motive necessary, for the

7. Smith, Frolic and Detour (1923) 23 COL L. Rnv. 444.
8. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability (1916) 26 YAL L. J. 105.
9. Ibid.
10. Isaacs, Fault and Liability (1918) 31 HAaV. L. REV. 954, 960 (mistakes
as to title are no excuse; in accident cases the doctrine res ipsa loquitur is significant. Statutes creating presumptions of negligence may be indicative of the
public feeling as to the necessity of fault. Thus note the statutes relating to
railroad fires.)
11. RESTATEMENT, AGFNCY (1933) § 219.
12. Edwards v. Earnest, 208 Ala. 539, 94 So. 598 (1922).
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mixed motives which activate human conduct are seldom susceptible of complete
isolation or exact measurement. On the one hand it is apparent the master is
not liable in all cases where the servant is engaged to do certain designated work
and voluntarily performs a different type.' 3 The servant must be doing a kind
of act he was employed to perform. Yet, on the other, it is not essential that
the servant be solely motivated to further his master's interests. He may be
effectuating his own desires as well as those of his master and still be within
the scope of his employment.'14 We might tentatively take the position that a
predominant motive to serve the master is sufficient for the master's liability.
However, even this view must be somewhat modified. Assume that a servant,
in the capacity of a chauffeur, is proceeding along the exact route his master
ordered him to follow. Desiring to determine the maximum speed the car will
attain, he opens-the throttle. Without a doubt his primary motive is to ascertain
this speed, but it cannot be doubted that in such case a master would be
responsible should such servant negligently injure the plaintiff in the course of
his experiment. It matters not that the chauffeur disobeyed his employer's
instructions by speeding. 15 Or suppose the servant's duties require him to
proceed along Broadway from A to B. He picks up a lady friend and offers to
take her to her home. This new journey would necessitate some deviation from
his direct route. But prior to reaching the point at which deviation would commence, an accident occurs. The master has been held liable. 16 A predominant
intention to serve his own purpose in preference to his master's is clearly not
enough to free the master. The same is true where a chauffeur is on some frolic
of his own, but later turns back with the intention of returning to the fold of
his master's employ. His employer is not immediately liable for accidents at
that time,' 7 simply because of the subjective determination to return, which
primarily motivates the servant at that time.
Similarly if the chauffeur is ordered to make a specified trip for his master
from A to B and he detours slightly, for some purpose of his own, at right angles
to the most direct route, numerous courts have considered him still within the
scope of his employment.' s But if he starts off in the opposite direction from
the ordered route, one court at least has held such journey not to be within the
scope of his employment, 19 although his motivation in this case would seem to
include as much of an ultimate desire to serve his master as in the right-angled

13. Brown v. Jarvis Engineering Co., 166 Mass. 75, 43 N. E. 1118 (1896);
Davis v. Price, 133 Miss. 236, 97 So. 557 (1923).
14. Clawson v. Pierce-Arrow Motor Co., 231 N. Y. 273, 131 N. E. 914 (1921).
15. Winfrey v. Lazarus, 148 Mo. App. 388, 128 S. W. 276 (1910); Flores v.
Garcia, 226 S. W. 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
16. Clawson v. Pierce-Arrow Motor Co., 231 N. Y. 273, 131 N. E. 914 (1921);
somewhat analogous is Fitzgerald v. Boston & N. St. R. R., 214 Mass. 435, 101
N. E. 1085 (1913).
17. Dowdell v. Beasley, 87 So. 18 (Ala. 1920).
18. D'Aleria v. Shirey, 286 Fed. 523 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Ryne v. Liebers
Farm Equip. Co., 107 Neb. 454, 186 N. W. 358 (1922); Thomas v. Lockwood Oil
Co., 174 Wis. 486, 182 N. W. 841 (1921).
19. McCarty v. Timmins, 59 N. E. 1038 (Mass. 1901).
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detour case. 20 Apparently there is no well-defined test of liability based on
motivation. It is inherently subject to such variation and change that it seems
of little utility as a peg upon which to hang the cap of a master's responsibility.
True, the motivation of the servant to serve his employer is of some value, for
without a certain element of such motivation the master is not normally held
liable for his employee's acts. But the cases cited amply show that motivation
alone cannot solve the problem of the scope of the servant's employ.
We have up to this point confined our attention solely to the servant's motive.
It is of interest to note that upon a partial motivation test the master in the
principal case might well have been held liable. In taking his wife to work on
his way to entering upon his official duties, it seems clear that the servant was
motivated in part, at least, by a desire to serve his master. Other considerations
may, however, be involved. The area within which the servant was supposed to
act is doubtless of significance. In fact, another test for grounding liability on
a master for an act of his deviating servant has been termed "the area of
probable deviation" test.21 This attempt recognizes that there exists an area
beyond and around the place within which the strict terms of the employment
require the servant to move, in which area common experience shows he will
probably deviate. Wandering within this area, it is said, constitutes a risk
properly belonging to the business, and injury to a member of the public by the
servant within this area should be borne as a cost of the business. Somewhat
analogous is the suggested "motivation-deviation" test, in which two essential
factors are considered: (1) satisfactory evidence that the employee in doing the
act, in the doing of which the tort was committed, was motivated in part at
least by a desire to serve his employer, and (2) satisfactory evidence that the
act, in the doing of which the tort was committed, was not an extreme deviation
22
from the normal conduct of such employees.
The difference between the two is sharply focused in the case where the
servant has begun a lengthy unforeseeable trip for his own purposes, a "frolic
of his own," the accident occurring, however, before he leaves the so-called area
of probable deviation. Under the motivation-deviation test, no liability would
presumably be assessed against the master, in view of the extremity of the
deviation begun, but under the zone-of-risk test the employee is still within the
zone of probable deviation, and it would seem that the employer should be held
responsible.23 Had the employee gotten without this zone, liability would have
been denied under either test.

20. It has been suggested that liability should be founded on the probability
of the servant so deviating, regardless of the direction that the detour might
take, and the servant's motive would be instrumental in determining whether it
was probable that he would do what he did. (Smith, Frolic and Detour (1923)
23 COL L. Rnv. 716, 726.) This would be applicable, even though the employee
had driven past point B, the authorized destination, and was proceeding on some
mission of his own (Duffy v. Hickey, 151 La. 274, 91 So. 733 (1922)).
21. Kohlman v. Hyland, 54 N. D. 710, 210 N. W. 643 (1926).
22. TInFANY, AGENCY (Powell's ed. 1924) 106.
23. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38 YAmm
L. J.584.
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Some influence that finds but vague recognition in the "tests" employed is
evidently here at work. Possibly it may be isolated through an analysis based on
the social factors involved. When society grants an individual the right to
engage in business, it seems reasonable to say that it makes certain demands
upon him in return. Among them may be the responsibility for the injuries
resulting from his servant's negligence in the conduct of this business. In
assessing this liability, the courts should not restrict themelves to acts commanded
by the master. Nor should they merely be guided by the probability of the
servant doing the act. Rather they should look at the normal risks one should
expect as a result of entering such a business. This risk load naturally includes
both authorized and certain unauthorized acts. Those of the latter category
are determined by what has gone on in the past in similar business enterprises,
as well as other acts which can be reasonably anticipated. The field of the
employer's liability for the servant's unauthorized deviation should not be
bounded by mechanical fences of time, space, or distance. These tests entirely
disregard the crux of the whole matter-that injuries of the type in question are
the inevitable result of carrying on the business enterprise in the manner employed. The fact that most employees are financially unable to furnish adequate
recompense for their own torts is generally accepted today. Thus the issue
boils down to whether the party hiring the negligent servant or the injured third
party must bear this loss. If the negligent act is of a class of risks that can
be said to be within the normal scope of the employer's business, then that
employer, it is submitted, should pay. One entering upon a business venture
must accept burdens as well as benefits. Against his possible profits, the master
should offset the normal and reasonable risks of such a type of business. These
risks are varying, each business presents its own distinct problem, and only by
such an analysis for the particular business involved can the correct limits of
the master's liability be ascertained.
Assuming the servant has gotten beyond the bounds of his employment, he
may later decide and attempt to re-enter that employ. This presents the problem
of return. When is he again within the scope of his employment? Certain
English cases have adopted the view that the employee does not re-enter his
master's employ until he has returned to the place from whence he departed. 24
American courts are at variance as to the point at which re-entry takes place.
One line of cases is in accord with the English decisions. Under this view it is
imperative that the servant return to his place of departure before a re-entry
occurs.2 5 The theory behind this view is based on the idea the journey back is

24. Mitchell v. Crassweller, 13 C. B. 237 (C. P. 1853); Raynor v. Mitchell,
2 C. P. D. 357 (1877).
25. Colwell v. Aetna Bottle & Stopper Co., 33 R. I. 531, 82 Atl. 388 (1912),
dissenting opinion in Barmore v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry., 85 Miss. 426, 38 So. 210,
216 (1905). The rule was expressed in Humphrey v. Hogan, 104 S. W. (2d) 767,
769 (Mo. 1937). Quoting from 5 BLAsEFIELD, CYC. Or AUTOMOBILE LAw &
PRACTIcE (Permanent ed. 1934) 212: "The majority rule, and probably the better
view, is that the. relation of master and servant is not restored until he has
returned to the place where the deviation occurred or to a corresponding place,
some place where, in the performance of his duty, he should be."
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as much of an independent mission as the journey out. His duty to return results
from the out-bound trip. Consequently no termination of this frolic occurs until
the point of departure is re-attained. 26 Yet it is clear that this test will not fit
all cases, for the servant may return to his commanded business by some other
route.
At the opposite extreme, other cases hold the servant has re-entered the
7
scope of his employment when he begins his return trip.2 Underlying this
determinant of liability seems to be the idea of motive. On his return trip the
servant is predominantly motivated by his master's business-by a desire to
return the vehicle to such business and to once more take up his duties as a
servant. Regardless of his motive, however, he may still be far from his post
of duty and the English and the first mentioned American views apparently
subordinate this element of motive to the still-existing element of remoteness
to the normal area of duty.
There is another possible view which may be taken. While not contending
that the exact point of departure must be returned to, some courts have held
that the master's liability re-attaches when the servant reaches some point where,
in the performance of his duties, he should be. 28 This view was well expressed
-9
in the words of the court in Dockweiler v. Ame rican Piano Go., as follows:
"Where there has been a temporary abandonment, I think the servant cannot
ordinarily be said to have returned to his master's service until he has, compatible
with his regular or lawful duties, or (sic), at least, reached a point in a zone
within which his labors would have been consistent with an act of deviation
merely had the original act been such in its other circumstances to have been
one of deviation and not one of temporary abandonment." There is much to be
said for this view. It recognizes that both motivation and geographical location
are involved in a servant's "scope" of employment, and, it would seem, the
element of time also.30
None of the aforementioned tests appear to satisfactorily answer the question
of re-entry, involving, as it does, the whole complex question of the scope of a
servant's employment. It is clear that mere motivation to return should not bind
the master and it is equally clear that he should not be relieved of responsibility

26. See authorities cited in (1922) 22 CO. L. Rnv. 573, 574.
27. Heelan v. Guggenheim, 210 Ill. App. 1 (1918); Frisch v. Lorber, 95 Misc.
574, 159 N. Y. Supp. 722 (1916) (even if servant deviates slightly on route back
to rejoin his master's employ, the master is still liable from the time he starts
back to rejoin his employ.) Mciernan v. Lehmaier, 85 Conn. 111, 81 Atl. 969
(1911).
28. Crady v. Greer, 183 Ky. 675, 210 S. W. 167 (1919); Brinkman v. Zuckerman, 192 Mich. 624, 159 N. W. 316 (1916); Tuttle v. Dodge, 116 At. 627 (N. H.
1927); collection of cases in (1923) 22 A. L. R. 1414.
29. 94 Misc. 712, 720, 160 N. Y. Supp. 270 (1916).
30. For a case in which time was construed to be the distinguishing feature
between frolic and detour, see Canon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 208 Pac. 519
(Utah, 1922). Although the servant was spatially within the scope of his
employment, the fact that he had spent some few hours for a purpose of his own
constituted a frolic, and the court held he had not at the time of the accident
re-entered his master's employment.
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until he returns to the exact point of departure. The compromise view presents
obvious advantages, but any test so broad as to include within the determining
factors such elements as motive, location, and time, comes close to merely stating
the proposition that all of the attendant facts and circumstances must be considered. While this is undoubtedly true in this situation, it is true in any
situation. It is no "test."
The fact is, it is submitted, that no formula, be it of time, space, or motive,
is of substantial value in determining scope of employment or re-entry thereinto.
The problem is one of normal business burdens, and should be frankly recognized
as such. The court, in the instant case of Pesot v. Yanda has, it is felt, mechanically followed a spatial test in holding the servant to be without the scope of
his employment principally because he was "thirteen or fourteen blocks away
from the place where his duty to his master called him." The decision might
well be compared with that of Kohlman v. Hyland,31 a case in which an added
private jaunt of the servant's took him about thirty-five miles out of his way on
a trip approximately one hundred miles in extent. In reversing a dismissal of the
plaintiff's case by the trial court, the upper court said, in part: "There is an
ever-present probability that third persons will suffer injury because somebody's
servant is careless, disobedient, or unfaithful to his master. This is a real, not
an imaginary risk, to which bear abundant witness the development of the
doctrine of respondeatsuperior and the myriad cases where courts have been lost
in the metaphysical refinement in definition between frolic and detour. This
latter risk to the public is one which industry, or the analogy of the Compensation Acts, may well be required to carry, within reasonable bounds."
WILImAM AULL, III

INSURANCE-THE MISSOURI MISREPRESENTATION STATUTE
Few statutes have received as much interpretation and construction by the
Missouri courts as the "misrepresentation" section,1 providing:
"No misrepresentation made in obtaining or securing a policy of
insurance on the life or lives of any person or persons, citizens of this
state, shall be deemed material, or render the policy void, unless the matter misrepresented shall have actually contributed to the contingency or
event on which the policy is to become due and payable, and whether it so
contributed in any case shall be a question for the jury."
The Missouri court has not infrequently pointed out the purpose and nature of
this enactment in these terms:
. . . said section was enacted to prevent insurance companies from
preparing a policy . . . offering attractive features of indemnity, but,

31.
1.

54 N. D. 710, 210 N. W. 643 (1926).
Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1939) § 5843.
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by questions to which answers were required having little or nothing to
do with the liability involved, arranging it so that upon the slightest incorrectness or deviation from the true facts by the insured in his answers
thereto, a situation was created whereby indemnity could be successfully
withheld regardless of whether the error or misrepresentation had anything to do with the event which matured the policy. That being the
evil aimed at, of course, the courts have very properly set their faces like
flint against any scheme or device to avoid
coming within its purview,
2
or to escape the effect of its provisions."
The court has not lost sight of this purpose, and seeks to upset any subterfuge
or device designed to afford an escape from the provisions of the statute. Misrepresentation is not abrogated as a defense to an action on the policy, but its
availability is immeasurably curtailed.
The statute is not specifically directed to matters of pleading, and thus has
affected only incidentally the common law rules of pleading the defense of misrepresentation. Such defense is still affirmative in nature.
The plaintiff establishes his prima facie case by evidence of the existence of the policy and the death
of insured. 4 The defendant insurer must plead that the matter misrepresented was
material, 5 and that it contributed to the contingency or event upon which the policy is payable.6 The insurer must allege that it would not have issued the policy
had it known the true facts 7 (although such allegation need not be shown by
direct proof).8

The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the elements

of the defense, and must show that the misrepresentation was of a type which
would avoid the policy in view of the statute.9 Since the insurer chose the
language used in the policy and application, therefore, any ambiguity found
therein will be construed liberally in favor of the insured.1 0

2. Reed v. Travelers Ins. Co., 227 Mo. App. 1155, 1158, 60 S. W. (2d) 59
(1933).
See also Schuermann v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 165 Mo. 641,
65 S. W. 723, 725 (1901); Keller v. Home Life Ins. Co., 198 Mo. 440, 95 S. W.
903 (1906); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 328 Mo. 876, 42 S. W. (2d) 584
(1931); Burns v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 141 Mo. App. 212, 216, 124 S. W.
539 (1910); Bruck v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 194 Mo. App. 529, 536,
185 S. W. 753 (1916).
3. Burgess v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 230 S. W. 315 (Mo. 1921);
State v. Allen, 313 Mo. 384, 282 S. W. 46 (1926); Masson v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 36 S. W. (2d) 118 (Mo. App. 1930); Friedman v. State Mut. Life
Assur. Co., 108 S. W. (2d) 156 (Mo. App. 1937); Clegg v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 141 S. W. (2d) 143 (Mo. App. 1940).
4. Clegg v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 141 S. W. (2d) 143 (Mo.
App. 1940).
5. As a test of materiality-would it have affected the company's decision
as to taking the risk, or the rate of the premium, or in estimating the degree or
character of the risk? Chambers v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 S. W. (2d)
29 (Mo. App. 1940).
6. Christian v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 143 Mo. 460, 45 S. W. 268 (1898);
Aloe v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n, 164 Mo. 675, 55 S. W. 993 (1900).
7. Christian v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 143 Mo. 460, 45 S. W. 268 (1898);
Summers v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 Mo. App. 691 (1901).
8. Simpson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 282 S. W. 454 (Mo. App. 1926).
9. State v. Allen, 313 Mo. 384, 282 S. W. 46 (1926); Burgess v. PanAmerican Life Ins. Co., 230 S. W. 315 (Mo. 1921); Ryan v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 30 S. W. (2d) 190 (Mo. App. 1930); Masson v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 36 5. W. (2d) 118 (Mo. App. 1930); Friedman v. State Mut. Life Assur.
Co., 108 S. W. (2d) 156 (Mo. App. 1937).
10. Brown v. Railway Passenger Assur. Co., 45 Mo. 221, 226 (1870);
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A preponderance of the cases construing the misrepresentating statute are
found to be concerned with particular words or phrases used, thus furnishing
a convenient segregation for purposes of discussion. The opening words "No
misrepresentation" have provided a variety of questions for decision by the Missouri courts. The reports are replete with cases reiterating that the section
applies with equal force and effect to warranties and misrepresentations,11 removing the availability of the doctrine of warranty as a device of the insurer to
require literal and precise truth of statements expressly made warranties in
the contract of insurance, no matter how immaterial they might be to the risk
involved, and regardless of whether their breach resulted in prejudice or detriment to the insurer. 12 The cases still contain the word "warranty," but today
the misrepresentation section has resulted in a change in its meaning. Today
it designates a phrase incorporated in the insurance contract, appearing the
same as the common law warranty, but, by virtue of the statute, resulting in
different consequences-i. e., an imposition of the additional requirement that
its breach result in or contribute to the contingency maturing the policy, before
13
its common law consequences are available to the insurer.
Missouri courts have frequently said that the misrepresentation section is
applicable "alike to warranties and misrepresentations, and draws no distinction
between innocent and fraudulent misrepresentations." Nevertheless, cases can be
found which hold that "fraud" (which the court interprets to mean "known
falsity") must be shown to avoid the policy, in addition to the requirement that
it contribute to the loss.14 As late as 1935, when Kirk v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. 15 was decided, the Supreme Bench held that no distinction was to
be drawn between innocent and fraudulent misrepresentations, a rule which was
said to be true especially in cases involving "sound health" clauses, citing the

Mathews v. Modern Woodmen of America, 236 Mo. 326, 139 S. W. 151, 155 (1911);
Houston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 Mo. App. 195, 97 S. W. (2d) 856
(1936).
11. Jenkins v. Covenant Mut. Life Ins. Co., 171 Mo. 375, 71 S. W. 688
(1903): "This doctrine of warranties, in the extent to which it had grown
and was applied, was something peculiar to insurance companies, and was
therefore thought the subject of special legislation, in a law which properly
undertook to affect insurance companies alone in that particular. By a long
and hurtful practice of a given policy peculiarly their own, insurance companies
had stamped themselves as a class, to which alone legislation might properly
address itself, in that regard."--Quoting from Schuermann v. Union Central
Life Ins. Co., 165 Mo. 641, 65 S. W. 723 (1901); Keller v. Home Life Ins. Co.,
198 Mo. 440, 95 S. W. 903 (1906); Dodt v. Prudential Ins. Co., 186 Mo. App.
168, 171 S. W. 655 (1914); Bruck v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 194
Mo. App. 529, 185 S. W. 753 (1916); Yancey v. Central Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 77
S. W. (2d) 149 (Mo. App. 1934).
12. Loehner v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Mo. 247 (1852); Mers v. Franklin
Ins. Co., 68 Mo. 127 (1878); Aloe v. Mut. Reserve Life Ass'n, 147 Mo. 561, 49 S.
W. 553 (1898).
13. Yancey v. Central Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 77 S. W. (2d) 149 (Mo. App. 1934).
14. Burgess v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 230 S. W. 315 (Mo. 1921); Bruck
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 194 Mo. App. 529, 185 S. W. 753 (1916);
Boillot v. Income Guaranty Co., 231 Mo. App. 990, 83 S. W. (2d) 219 (1935).
15. 336 Mo. 765, 81 S. W. (2d) 333 (1935).
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earlier case of Kern v. Supreme Council.1 6 The language used in the Kirk case
seems to overrule any contrary cases, but in the next year, the St. Louis Court
of Appeals, in Houston v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,1 imposed a definite
qualification to the blanket statement of the supreme court, and drew a marked
distinction between misrepresentations and warranties as regards innocence and
fraud by saying:
"The rule in this State . . . is that where material representations made . . . are warranted to be true . . . the representations, if in fact untrue, will avoid the policy, though the representations
were innocently made. This is so because such is the contract. The
insurer is entitled to stand on the contract as written, and the innocence
of the insured in making the representations is a matter of no concern.
But where there is no such warranty or provision in the policy a misrepresentation in order to avoid the policy must have been fraudulently made.
This is the rule applicable to contracts generally, and we see no reason
why an exception should be made with respect to insurance contracts."
(Italics mine)
Thus, if the matter misrepresented is not expressly made a warranty or a
defense to the policy, the insurer must prove; first, that it was fraudulently made;
and, second, that it contributed to the loss, in order to avoid liability successfully.
The Houston case distinguishes the Kirk case on the ground that the latter involved a sound health clause providing that the policy was not to become effective
unless the policy was delivered while the insured was in sound health. This
distinction between misrepresentations and warranties with its attendant result
of requiring knowledge or not, as the case might be, has been accorded consistent
recognition in a series of appeals cases. In Schriedel v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co.,18 the company was released without showing fraud, where therewas a sound health clause. There again, however, the denial of a distinction
between an innocent and fraudulent misrepresentation is asserted. To the same
effect is Woodson v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co.' 9 DeValpine 'v. New York
Life Insurance Co., 20 maintains in no uncertain terms that there exists a difference between misrepresentations and warranties in this respect, quoting with
approval the Houston case, and holding that since the statements there involved
were expressly made representations and not warranties, the insurer must prove
known falsity. No sound health clause is to be found in that case, and the Kirk
case was expressly distinguished. Other appeals cases have since made the
same distinction,21 although some tenability could be given a contrary view, in
line with the dictum of the Kirk case. The federal circuit court of appeals has
held otherwise in construing this statute, requiring known falsity in any case,

16. 167 Mo. 471, 67 S.W. 252 (1902).
17. 232 Mo. App. 195, 205, 97 S. W. (2d) 856 (1936).
18. 133 S. W. (2d) 1103 (Mo. App. 1939).
19. 84 S. W. (2d) 390 (Mo. App. 1935).
20. 105 S. W. (2d) 977 (Mo. App. 1937).
21. Fields v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 119 S. W. (2d) 463 (Mo. App.
1938); DeValpine v. New York Life Ins. Co., 131 S. W. (2d) 349 (Mo. App.
1939); Clegg v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 141 S. W. (2d) 143 (Mo.
App. 1940).
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though recognizing all the while that the matter is one of general concern so
that Missouri's construction is not necessarily controlling in federal courts. 22
Life policies commonly provide that should the age of the insured be misstated, the amount payable under the policy shall be the amount of insurance
the actual premium paid would have purchased at the rate for insured's correct
age. Resolving the former conflict, and specifically overruling a series of
cases from our appeals courts, the supreme court, in Langan v. United States
Life Insurance Co.,23 held such age adjustment clauses not prohibited by the
24
misrepresentation section, deeming the Missouri "non-discrimination" statute
to compel the result, saying:
"If a person obtains insurance by stating a given age, nothing
further being said on the subject in the policy, then, under the statute,
it may be that the company can not question the correctness of the age
stated. But is there anything in the statute which prevents a person
from obtaining insurance at a stated age, qualified by a provision in the
contract for adjustment according to correct age? We do not so read
the statute. Nor do we know of any dictate of public policy to prevent
such an age adjustment clause."
Nevertheless, misrepresentations of age are within the purview of the statute
and will avoid the policy, if they are found to contribute to the maturing
2
event. 5
The typical case in which the statute is held to apply, and in which it is
frequently possible for a misstatement to contribute to the event of maturity,
involves a misrepresentation as to the condition of insured's health. The
"sound health" warranty clauses are held to be within the purview of the
section, so that although the company can stipulate that the policy is not to
become valid unless it is delivered while the insured is in sound health, the
policy will not be avoided unless the unsound condition contributed to the maturing
26
contingency.

22. Security Life Ins. Co. v. Brimmer, 36 F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 8th,
1929), cert. denied, 50 Sup. Ct. 350. Quaere: Has this been altered by Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins?
23. 130 S. W. (2d) 479, 483 (Mo. 1939).
24. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 5840, providing: "No life insurance company
shall make or permit any distinction or discrimination in favor of
individuals between insurants (the insured) of the same class and equal expectations of life in the amount or payment or premiums or rates charged for
policies.

"

25. Burgess v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 230 S. W. 315 (Mo. 1921);
Cave v. Missouri Ins. Co., 102 S. W. (2d) 755 (Mo. App. 1937).
26. Benson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 144 S. W. 122 (Mo. 1912); Coscarella v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 175 Mo. App. 130, 157 S. W. 873 (1913);
Hicks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 196 Mo. App. 162, 190 S. W. 661 (1916);
Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 30 S. W. (2d) 190 (Mo. App. 1930); Sappington v. Central Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n, 229 Mo. App. 222, 77 S. W. (2d) 140 (1934);
Fields v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 119 S. W. (2d) 463 (Mo. App. 1938).
Contra: Prince v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 129 S. W. (2d) 5 (Mo. App. 1939),
where the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that the sound health clause can
be a basis for suit to cancel before death, and until then the insurer has the
option to declare the policy void. But thereafter liability of the insurer is
limited to a return of the premiums paid, if the insured was not in sound health
but was instead suffering from a disease or condition contributing to death.
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The statute does not operate to prevent the insurer from refusing to cover
a designated class of persons, or a particular risk, termed an "exception." 27 The
insurance coverage is considered as never extending to the person of the class,
or of the risk, excepted. Similarly, the section does not preclude the insurer
from denying that the one signing the contract, or the one actually examined,
was not the one insured, so that no contract in fact was ever made with the
28
insured.
The statute speaks of misrepresentations made "in obtaining or securing
a policy," and in interpreting this the courts have held that the misrepresentations
must have been made before the issuance of the policy, and for the purpose
of obtaining it.29 The matters misrepresented must be presently existing, as
distinguished from those to transpire in the future, so that the section does
'3s
not apply to the so-called "promissory warranty.
The phrase "policy of insurance on the life or lives, etc." has been given
just that construction, the courts holding that it has no application to other
types of insurance such as burglary policies, 31 or fidelity bonds.32 It obviously
cannot apply to any type of property insurance. The section has been held to
apply to accident 33 and health34 clauses in life policies, since there is no rational
explanation why it should be applicable where death results, and inapplicable
where it does not. 35 Not only does the section prevent denial of liability in the
original policy, but should the policy lapse for nonpayment of premiums, and
subsequently become reinstated, the same limitations are imposed on the insurer
as to defenses of misrepresentations made in the application for reinstatement,36
37
even though the application contains a stipulation to the contrary.

27. Carter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 275 Mo. 84, 204 S. W. 399 (1918),
holding that where the physical examination was not taken by the insured but
by one impersonating him, no real agreement had ever been entered into by the
parties, because the party contracting for insurance did not submit to an examination and, therefore, the statute was held inapplicable. In Johnson v.
Central Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 143 S. W. (2d) 257 (Mo. 1940), the age limitation of an
assessment company held an excepted risk. Reed v. Travelers Ins. Co., 227
Mo. App. 1155, 60 S. W. (2d) 59 (1933) (excepted all crippled persons from an
accident policy).
28. Carter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 275 Mo. 84, 204 S. W. 399 (1918).
29. Langan v. United States Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 989, 130 S. W. (2d)
479 (1939); Reed v. Travelers Ins. Co., 227 Mo. App. 1155, 60 S. W. (2d) 59
(1933).
30. Mathews v. Modern Woodmen of America, 236 Mo. 326, 139 S. W. 151
(1911).
31. Lieberman v. American Bonding & Cas. Co., 244 S. W. 102 (Mo. App.
1922).
32. Commercial Bank v. American Bonding Co., 194 Mo. App. 224, 187
S.W. 99 (1916).
33. Lamport v. Genl Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Co., 272 Mo. 19, 197 S.
W. 95 (1917); Williams v. Mut. Life, 283 S. W. 64 (Mo. App. 1926); Boillot
v. Income Guaranty Co., 231 Mo. App. 990, 83 S. W. (2d) 219 (1935).
34. Makos v. Bankers' Acc. Ins. Co., 234 S. W. 369 '(Mo. App. 1921).
35. No cases are to be found in which the policy has features of accident
and health alone, without a sum to be paid upon death also.
36. Jenkins v. Covenant Mut. Life Ins. Co., 171 Mo. 375, 71 S. W. 688
(1903); Woods v. National Aid Life Ass'n, 87 S. W. (2d) 698 (Mo. App. 1935).
37. Masson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 36 S. W. (2d) 118 (Mo. App. 1930).
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- While the misrepresentation section was formerly construed to apply only
to "old line" policies, 38 it is now held to apply to assessment policies as well.89
By virtue of Section 6108, Missouri Revised Statutes, 1939,40 a fraternal beneficiary association is exempt from the general insurance laws of this state, including the misrepresentation section,41 whether the company in question be a
domestic or foreign corporation. 42 Here, however, the form of the policy,
and not the nature of the company, will be examined to resolve the question,
so that if a fraternal beneficiary association be found to have issued an "old
43
line" policy, the statute will be held applicable.
.
. unless
shall be deemed material
"No misrepresentation . .
to
the
contingency
actually
contributed
shall
have
the matter misrepresented
or event upon which the policy is to become due and payable." To all intents
and purposes, materiality of misrepresentations in avoiding liability on life
policies, since the enactment of the misrepresentation section, has been of little
moment. Materiality has been found only where the matter misrepresented did
contribute, and hence the two appear to have a synonymous connotation to the
court. The meat of the section lies in this contributing requirement, and its
enactment has removed as a source of avoiding liability many particular misrepresentations which by their very nature can seldom, if ever, contribute to
the maturing event. Typical examples are found in cases of misrepresentations
of age,44 of other insurance carried,45 of prior rejection for insurance with another company, 46 that the beneficiary was the insured's wife,47 and of former

38. Jacobs v. Omaha Life Ass'n, 146 Mo. 523, 48 S. W. 472 (1898); Elliott
v. Des Moines Life Ass'n, 163 Mo. 132, 63 S.W. 400 (1901); Wilson v. Brotherhood, 297 Mo. 655, 249 S. W. 650 (1923). Accord: Kribs v. United Order of
Foresters, 191 Mo. App. 524, 177 S.W. 766 (1915).
39. Aloe v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n, 164 Mo. 675, 55 S. W. 993 (1899),
discusses at length the history and purpose of the statutes, and overrules prior
cases exempting assessment companies from the operation of the misrepresentation section. Williams v. St. Louis Life Ins. Co., 189 Mo. 70, 87 S. W. 999
(1905) ; Herzberg v. Modern Brotherhood, 110 Mo. App. 328, 85 S.W. 986 (1905) ;
Wilson v. Ass'n, 125 Mo. App. 597, 103 S. W. 109 (1907); Yancey v. Central
Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 77 S.W. (2d) 149 (Mo. App. 1934).
40. Providing: "Except as herein provided, such societies (fraternal beneficiary associations) shall be governed by this article and shall be exempt from
all provisions of the insurance laws of this state, not only in governmental relations with the state, but for every other purpose, and no law hereafter enacted
shall apply to them, unless they be expressly designated therein."
41. Wilson v. Ass'n, 125 Mo. App. 597, 103 S. W. 109 (1907); Hartmann
v. National Council, 190 Mo. App. 92, 175 S. W. 212 (1915) ; Wilhelm v. Security
Ben. Ass'n, 233 Mo. App. 484, 121 S.W. (2d) 295 (1938).
42. Williams v. St. Louis Life Ins. Co., 189 Mo. 70, 87 S. W. 999 (1905);
Aloe v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n, 164 Mo. 675, 55 S. W. 993 (1899); Wilson
v. Ass'n, 125 Mo. App. 597, 103 S. W. 109 (1907); Kribs v. United Order of
Foresters, 191 Mo. App. 524, 177 S.W. 766 (1915).
43. State v. Trimble, 292 Mo. 371, 239 S. W. 467 (1922).
44. See notes .23,24, 25, supra.
•45. Limbaugh v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 84 S.W. (2d) 208 (Mo. App. 1935).
46. "Just how a statement that an insured had never been rejected for
insurance can enter into the cause of an insured's death is not entirely clear;
but, in any event, there is no showing here that it did." Yancey v. Central Mut.
Ins. Ass'n, 77 S.W. (2d) 149 (Mo. App. 1934).
47. Lamport v. Gen'l Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Co., 272 Mo. 19, 197 S.W.
95 (1917); Ashford v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 98 Mo. App. 505, 72 S. W.
(2d) 712 (1903).
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Although in the ordinary case, misrepresentations of

temperance would be difficult to prove to have contributed to the event, they
49
are within the purview of the section.
In any case, the statute provides that whether the matter misrepresented
did contribute to the event is a question for the jury, and the court has jealously
50
It is said that:
enforced the requirement.
. . . whether or not it is true that the matter misrepresented caused
or contributed to the death of the insured, is a question of fact for the
plaintiff wholly unjury unless it be foreclosed by an admission of the
51
explained or uncontradicted by other evidence."
A unique application of the jury provision is found in the cases where the
insurer seeks cancellation of the policy. The section does not prevent the
insurer's suit to cancel in every case.

If the right of cancellation were available

before the passage of the act, it is retained under the act, except where the suit
is commenced by the beneficiary after the event which matures the policy. The
courts have reasoned that after the event, the rights became fixed and absolute,
2
so that the
and the statutory right of trial by jury prevents cancellation,
insurer may not pray for such relief in a cross-bill, attempting to convert the
55
It is only under exceptional circumstances
action into one essential equitable.
that the insurer has the right to sue for cancellation after the insured's death,
and such circumstances have been recognized only where an incontestable clause
in the policy would remove a defense of misrepresentation, and where the
beneficiary plaintiff delays in instituting suit upon the policy, with a view to
54
There if
the barring of the defense under the clause by the lapse of time.

48. Security Life Ins. Co. v. Brimmer, 36 F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929);
Keller v. Home Life Ins. Co., 198 Mo. 440, 95 S. W. 903 (1906); Emery v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 257 S. W. 162 (Mo. App. 1923); Houston v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 232 Mo. App. 195, 97 S. W. (2d) 856 (1936).
49. Harms v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 172 Mo. App. 241, 157 S. W. 1046
(1913).
50. Simpson v. Ins. Co., 310 Mo. 378, 276 S. W. 877 (1925), on resubmission,
282 S. W. 454 (1926); Scott v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 281 S. W. 67 (Mo.
App. 1926); Mudd v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 39 S. W. (2d) 450 (Mo.
App. 1931).
51. Mudd v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 39 S. W. (2d) 450 (Mo.
App. 1931).
52. Schuermann v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 165 Mo. 641, 65 S. W. 723
(1901). In Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Glaser, 245 Mo. 377, 150 S. W. 549
(1912), the court says: "It is apparent that this statute applies only to cases
in which the 'event on which the policy is to become due' has actually happened,
and the liability of the insurer under the policy is the question to be determined.
It was not intended to restrict the freedom of contract except in such cases as
came within its provisions. The case 'efore us is not an action to enforce liability under a contract of insurance. The event on which the obligation is made
contingent had not occurred, and therefore the rights of the parties are not
affected by the statute, but are to be settled under the general law as though
the statute did not exist." New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ince, 27 S. W. (2d) 476
(Mo. App. 1930); Wollums v. Mut. Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n, 226 Mo. App. 647,
46 S. W. (2d) 259 (1931).
53. Schuermann v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 165 Mo. 641, 65 S. W. 723
(1901); State v. Allen, 313 Mo. 384, 282 S. W. 46 (1926).
54. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 219 Mo. App. 609, 282 S. W. 494
(1926), approved in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 328 Mo. 876, 42 S. W. (2d)
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suit to cancel is not allowed, the insurer's legitimate defense of misrepresentation
is extinguished by the deliberate forbearance from suit by the plaintiff.
EDW. E. MANSUR

PRACTICE--DOMICILE AS A BASIS OF JURISDICTION-SERVICE REQUIRED IN ACTIONS

In Personam
Under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution and under
the statute passed by Congress in pursuance thereof, each state is required to
give to state judgments "such faith and credit . . . as they have by law or
usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken."' But the rendition
of a personal judgment by a court of a state, against a person over whom the
state has no jurisdiction, is invalid even in the state in which it is rendered, as
an infringement of the "due process of law" provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 2 Such a judgment is not protected by the full
faith and credit provision and will be treated as void in other states.3 Since the
question of jurisdiction over the person is a federal question, the decisions of
the Supreme Court -of the United States are binding upon the states.
A state cannot render a valid personal judgment against a person unless,
(1) he is subject to the jurisdiction of the state, and (2) a method of notification
is employed which is reasonably calculated to give him knowledge of the action
and an opportunity to defend.4 Both of these requirements must be met in order
to comply with due process of law. For example, a non-resident, non-consenting
absentee is not subject to the jurisdiction of a state.5 Hence, even actual service
on such a non-resident outside of the jurisdiction is insufficient.0 If a person is
not subject to the jurisdiction of a state, the service of notice outside the state
will not give validity to the judgment, no matter how efficacious the notice is in
giving knowledge of the action. A fortiori, service by publication on a nonresident is insufficient.7 On the other hand, a state cannot exercise judicial jurisdiction over a person, although he is subject to the jurisdiction of the state,

584 (1931). By virtue of Mo. Laws 1939, § 5771, p. 430, the statutory one year
incontestable clause, under which the rights of the parties are held to "freeze,"
this question would seldom, if ever, arise.
1. U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1; REv. STAT. § 905 (1878).
2. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917); Riverside & Dan
River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S.189 (1915). See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U. S. 714 (1877); Needham v. Thayer, 147 Mass. 536, 18 N. E. 429 (1888).
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 74.
3. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 (1917); Dull v. Blackman, 169 U. S.
243 (1898); Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Co., 19 Wall. 58 (U. S.1873).
4. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 74-75.
5. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
6. Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U. S. 41 (1892); Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S.
476 (1878)..
7. Freeman v. Anderson, 119 U. S.185 (1886); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714 (1877).
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unless a method of notification is employed which is reasonably calculated to give
him notice of the suit and an opportunity to defend.8
It has been said that an individual is subject to the jurisdiction of a state in
at least five cases: 9 (1) when he is personally present within the state; (2) when
he has his domicile within the state; (3) when he is a citizen or subject owing
allegiance to the state; (4) when he has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction;
and (5) when he has, by his acts in the state, subjected himself to its jurisdiction.
There are decisions supporting jurisdiction in all these situations, but in some
of them there has been a difference of opinion.10
This comment is not concerned with all of these possible bases of jurisdiction
over the person of a defendant. The first problem presented by this paper may
be stated in this question: Has a state in which a person is domiciled, jurisdiction
to render a valid personal judgment against him, even though he is outside of the
state at the time of service of process?
It has been held by a few state courts that a state cannot acquire jurisdiction
over a person domiciled within the state but not present there at the time of
service of process." These cases seem to go on the ground that a state cannot
give extra-territorial effect to the process of the state. But the weight of
authority in the state courts seems to uphold jurisdiction in such a case, provided
a method of notification is employed which is reasonably calculated to give him
2
knowledge of the pendency of the action.'
As indicated above, a distinction must be drawn between the question whether
a person domiciled within a state but not present there is subject to the jurisdiction of the state, and the requirement that adequate notice be given. The
distinction is brought out in McDonald v. Mabee, where an action was brought
in Texas against a person domiciled there who had left the state, intending to
establish a domicile elsewhere. But he was still technically domiciled in Texas
and his family was there. Service was by publication. The Supreme Court of the
United States held that the judgment rendered in the case was void. It has been
said that this case holds that a state cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person

8. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 (1917); Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U. S.
503 (1875). A state cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person although he is
notified of the proceeding unless he is also given an opportunity to defend. See
Turner v. Fisher, 222 U. S. 204 (1911); Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398 (1900).
9. See RESTATgMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs (1934) §§ 77-85.
10. See BPAI , CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §§ 74.1-84.3; GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1938) § 70.
11. De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896)
(alimony, service by publication); Raher v. Raher, 150 Iowa 511, 129 N. W. 494
(1911) (service out of state on resident temporarily absent), quoted with approval
in Elk River Coal & Lumber Co. v. Funk, 222 Iowa 1222, 271 N. W. 204 (1937).
12. Henderson v. Staniford, 105 Mass. 504 (1870) (service by publication);
Northern Aluminum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 147 Atl. 715 (1929) (Canadian
judgment, service of notice in Baltimore while temporarily resident there); In re
Hendrickson, 40 S. D. 211, 167 N. W. 172 (1918) (service outside the state);
Fernandez v. Casey, 77 Tex. 452, 14 S. W. 149 (1890) (service by publication);
Becker v. Becker, 218 S. W. 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (service outside the state).
For a collection of cases, see Note (1940) 126 A. L. R. 1474. See also, RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 79.

13.

243 U. S.90 (1917).
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domiciled within the state but not present there at the time of service of process.
It is submitted, however, that the case does not support this proposition, for
the Court said that "a summons left at his last and usual place of abode would
have been enough."' 4 But "To dispense with personal service the substitute that
is most likely to reach the defendant is the least that ought to be required if
substantial justice is to be done."' s Most writers agree that McDonald v. Mabeo
merely decided that service by publication is not sufficient where there is a better
method available, such as leaving the summons at the last and usual place of
abode.' 6 The opinion indicates that domicile would be a sufficient basis for the
exercise of jurisdiction if reasonable notice is given. In any event, a recent
decision of the Federal Supreme Court definitely settles the question.
In Milliken v. Meyer, 1 7 an action was brought in Wyoming against a defendant domiciled there. The defendant was personally served with process in
Colorado pursuant to a Wyoming statute which authorized such service "in
actions where the defendant, being a resident of this state, has departed from
the county of his residence with the intent to delay or defraud his creditors, or
to avoid service of summons, or keeps himself concealed with like intent." The
Wyoming court entered an in personam judgment against the defendant who made
no appearance in the case. The Supreme Court of the United States held that
the Wyoming judgment was valid and that other states must give it faith and
credit. The Court said: "The state which accords him (the defendant) privileges
and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also
exact reciprocal duties ........
The attendant duties, like the rights and
privileges incident to domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the
state. One such incidence of domicile is amenability to suit within the state even
during sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and employed a
reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of the proceedings against
him. . . . . Here such a reasonable method was so provided and so employed."' 6
A contrary view has been expressed by the Supreme Court of Missouri. In
Moss v. Fitch, 9 decided in 1908, the plaintiff brought an action for divorce in
Missouri against her husband who was at the time in Wyoming. He was served
with process in Wyoming, but not in Missouri, and he did not appear in the
action. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to award a personal judgment for alimony. It would seem that the
actual decision in this case is not contrary to Milliken v. Meyer because (1) the
court apparently held that service outside the state was not authorized by
the Missouri statutes in actions in personam; and (2) it is not clear whether the
defendant was a resident or a non-resident of Missouri. As to. the first point, the

14. Id. at 92.
15. Ibid.
16. See BEALE, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (1935) § 75.1.
17. 61 Sup. Ct. 339 (1940).
18. Id. at 343.
19. 212 Mo. 484, 111 S.W. 475 (1908).
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statute20 expressly provides that in certain actions, including divorce actions,
service outside the state "shall be as effectual within the limits of this state as
personal service within this state." But the court said that "the legislature had
no intention of giving the service in Section 582 a broader scope than that of
publication, " 21 and that service by either method only gives the court jurisdiction
over the res in actions in rem.2 2 If service outside the state is not authorized by
statute, in actions in personam, the decision is pot inconsistent with Milliken V.
Meyer. Because a state can exercise jurisdiction over an individual domiciled
within the state, by serving him outside the state, it does not follow that in a
particular state that method of service is authorized by law. It would seem,
therefore, that the decision in Milliken v. Meyer is of importance in Missouri
only where a court here is asked to give full faith and credit to a judgment of
another state based upon such service. It will be noted, however, that in discussing the constitutionality of a statute authorizing such service, the court said:
"In other words, no process issued by the courts of this State and served upon
the party defendant in another State can be the basis of a personal judgment.
And this is true whether the party is a citizen of this state or of another state.
To be more explicit, when our process crosses the State line it loses its vitality as
an instrument upon which a personal judgment can be entered. '2 3 This view was
repudiated in Milliken v. Meyer. It is believed that the Supreme Court of Missouri
failed to draw the distinction mentioned above and brought out in McDonald v.
Mabee and Milliken v. Meyer. As previously stated, actual service of process
outside the state, while it cannot enlarge a state's jurisdiction, seems the best
method of giving notice of a pending action to one who is subject to the jurisdiction of the state by virtue of his domicile.
Three methods of service upon an absent defendant have been attempted;
namely, personal service outside the state, service at the defendant's last and
usual place of abode, and service by publication. As stated above, the first
24
If a
method has been approved by the Supreme Court of the United States.
person domiciled within a state is subject to its jurisdiction, even though he is
outside the state, service at his usual place of abode within the state would seem
20
5
to constitute due process. Many state courts,2 including the Missouri courts,
have upheld this method of acquiring jurisdiction. Although *theFederal Supreme
Court has not rendered a definite decision on the point, it is believed that the

20. Mo. REv. STAT. (1899) § 582; Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 900.
21. Mo. REv. STAT. (1899) § 575; Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 891.
22. 212 Mo. 484, 497, 498, 111 S. W. 475, 477 (1908).
23. Id. at 501, 111 S. W. at 477. (Italics mine)
24. Milliken v. Meyer, 61 Sup. Ct. 339 (1940).
25. Buford v. Kirkpatrick, 13 Ark. 33 (1852); Hurlbut v. Thomas, 55 Conn.
181, 10 Atl. 556 (1887); Sturgis v. Fay, 16 Ind. 429 (1861); Harryman v. Roberts,
52 Md. 64 (1879); Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun. 578 (N. Y. 1884). See Note (1940)
126 A. L. R. 1474.
26. Wagoner v. Wagoner, 287 Mo. 567, 229 S. W. 1064 (1921). See also
Davis v. Carp, 258 Mo. 686, 167 S. W. 1042 (1914); Venuci v. Cademartori, 59
Mo. 352 (1875); Garth v. Robards, 20 Mo. 523 (1855); Independent Breweries Co.
v. Lavin, 207 S. W. 851 (Mo. App. 1919); Bensley v. Haeberle, 20 Mo. App. 648
(1886).
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Court would take the same position in view of the language used in several
opinions. 2 7 At least one state court has held that service by publication confers
jurisdiction over an absent defendant. 28 There are, however, state decisions on
the other side. 29 It is difficult to determine the position of the Supreme Court
of the United States with regard to the validity of service by publication, in
actions in personam.3 0 Professor Beale says: "It seems probable that service by
publication is insufficient in any case, whether a better mode of service is practicable or not, since the tendency to give the defendant notice is so slight; unless,
indeed, the defendant left the state in order to avoid service of process upon
him."31

It seems clear that service by publication is insufficient if another and
3 2
obviously better method of notification is practicable.
The Missouri cases hold that under the local statutes, service by publication
will not support a personal judgment.3 3 In most of these cases no point was

27. In Milliken v. Meyer, 61 Sup. Ct. 339, 342 (1940), the Supreme Court
said: "Substituted service in such cases has been quite uniformly upheld where
the absent defendant was served at his usual place of abode in the state (Huntley
v. Baker, 33 Hun, N. Y., 578; Hurlbut v. Thomas, 55 Conn. 181, 10 A. 556, 3 Am.
St. Rep. 43; Harryman v. Roberts, 52 Md. 64) as well as where he was personally
served without the state. In re Hendrickson, 40 S. D. 211, 167 N. W. 172. That
such substituted service may be wholly adequate to meet the requirements of
due process was recognized by this Court in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90,
37 S. Ct. 343, 61 L. Ed. 608, L. R. A. 1917F, 458, despite earlier intimations to
the contrary. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733, 24 L. Ed. 565; . .. .
See also Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U. S. 503 (1875); Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Co.,
19 Wall. 58, 61 (U. S. 1873).
28. Fernandez v. Casey, 77 Tex. 452, 14 S. W. 149 (1890). See Henderson v.
Staniford, 105 Mass. 504 (1870) (judgment obtained on such service is at most
voidable by the defendant, and cannot be treated as void by the plaintiff).
29. De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896).
See Bickerdike v. Allen, 157 Ill. 95, 41 N. E. 740 (1895) (publication alone not
sufficient, but publication and mailing valid).
See Note (1940) 126 A. L. R.
1474; Baylies v. Baylies, 196 App. Div. 677, 188 N. Y. Supp. 147 (1921) (where it
does not appear whether the defendant was a resident or non-resident at the
time of service).
30. "If the Supreme Court is, as seems to be the case, opposed to service
by publication as against a resident defendant who is within the state, a fortiori
would it be against such service when the defendant is absent from the state.
This also is the fair deduction from McDonald v. Mabee." Burdick, Service As a
Requirement of Due Process in Actions In Personam (1922) 20 MICH. L. REV.
422, 431. See also Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437 (U. S. 1850); Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U. S. 714 (1877) (defendant a non-resident).
31. 1 BFALi, CONFLIcr OF LAWS (1935) § 75.1, p. 336. As indicated by
Professor Beale, perhaps such service is sufficient where the defendant, by concealing himself in order to evade service, makes other methods of service impossible or impracticable. See Roberts v. Roberts, 135 Minn. 397, 161 N. W. 148
(1917) (where the defendant was concealing himself within the state); Skala v.
Brockman, 109 Neb. 259, 190 N. W. 860 (1922).
32. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 (1917); Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97,
46 N. W. 315 (1890) (service by publication; defendant could be found within
the state).
33. See Palmer v. Bank of Sturgeon, 281 Mo. 72, 218 S. W. 873 (1920);
Shemwell v. Bettis, 264 Mo. 268, 174 S. W. 390 (1915); Givens v. Harlow, 251 Mo.
231, 158 S. W. 355 (1913); State ex rel. McIndoe v. Blair, 238 Mo. 132, 142 S. W.
326 (1911); Bryant v. Duffy, 128 Mo. 18, 30 S. W. 317 (1895); Wilson v. St.
Louis, S. F. Ry., 108 Mo. 588, 18 S. W. 286 (1891); Ellison v. Martin, 53 Mo. 575
(1873); Payne v. Brooke, 217 S. W. 595 (Mo. App. 1920); Mauer v. Phillips, 182
Mo. App. 440, 168 S. W. 669 (1914); Elvins v. Elvins, 176 Mo. App. 645, 159
S. W. 746 (1913); Hedrix v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 103 Mo. App. 40, 77 S. W. 495
(1903).
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made as to whether the defendant was domiciled in Missouri, but the opinions
indicate that even if a statute authorizes service by publication, such service
is not alone a sufficient method of notification under any circumstances. Since the
Missouri statutes do not authorize service by publication in actions in personam,
this method is of importance in Missouri only when a court here is asked to
recognize a judgment of another state based upon such service.
The question of jurisdiction in personam over a domestic corporation raises
probjems analogous to those discussed above. It is said that a corporation is
domiciled in the state from which it receives its charter. While a corporation
cannot have a domicile in the same sense that an individual has one, it is subject
to the jurisdiction of the state of its incorporation and a court of that state can
render a valid personal judgment against the corporation if the method of service
is one which satisfies the constitutional requirement of due process of law.3 4 At
common law, the only proper method of service upon a domestic corporation was
by service upon "such head officer of a corporation as secured knowledge of the
process to the corporation." 35 Provision has been made by statute, however, for
service upon domestic corporations in other ways, and such methods are valid
if they have a reasonable tendency to give notice and opportunity to defend.
For example, service within the state upon an officer or responsible agent of the
corporation, other than the principal officer, is commonly provided for by statute
and is valid.3 6 Some statutes provide that if an officer or agent cannot be found
within the state, service of process may be made by handing a summons to an
officer or agent of the corporation outside the state. It has been held that the
method of service of process is sufficient to confer upon a court jurisdiction over
a domestic corporation.37 However, there is some authority to the contrary.38
Section 887 of the Missouri statutes provides that if an officer or agent of
the defendant corporation cannot be found within the state, service of process
may be made by delivering a summons to an officer or agent outside the state.3 9
In MeMenamy Investment & Real Estate Co. v. Stillwell Catering Co.,40 an
attachment suit, the defendant was a Missouri corporation but no officer or agent
of the defendant could be found within the state. An alias summons was served
upon the president in California. Judgment by default was entered against the
defendant, after its motion to quash was overruled. The Missouri Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment, Allen, J., dissenting on several grounds. The

34. 1 BEALE, CONFLICT o LAWS (1935) §§ 41.1, 87.1; RESTATEMENT, CoNFLcT oF LAWS (1934) § 87.
35. Kansas City R. R. v. Dougherty, 138 U. S. 298, 305 (1891).
36. See Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1939) §§ 887, 888; Taussig v. St. Louis & K. R. R.,
186 Mo. 269, 85 S.W. 378 (1905).
37. Bennett v. Chicago Lumber & Coal Co., 201 Iowa 770, 208 N. W. 519
(1926); Straub v. Lyman Land & Inv. Co., 30 S.D. 310, 141 N. W. 979 (1913),
aff'g, 30 S.D. 310, 138 N. W. 957 (1912), annotated in (1913) 27 HARv. L. REV.85.
See Comment (1930) 18 CALIF. L. Rav. 409; Note (1940) 126 A. L. R. 1474.
38. Baxter v. Continental Casualty Co., 48 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931)
(appeal dismissed in 284 U. S.578 (1931)).
39. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1909) § 1766; Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1939) § 887.
40. 175 Mo. App. 668, 158 S.W. 427 (1913).
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supreme court adopted the dissenting opinion and reversed the court of appeals.41
This decision is not convincing authority for the proposition that the Missouri
statute is unconstitutional. It will be noted that this was an attachment suit;
and that the court actually held that Section 88742 has no reference to service in
attachment suits, and that Section 900,43 providing for service in attachment suits,
does not authorize service upon a domestic corporation by serving its president
or chief officer in another state. Moreover, the court said that the plaintiff did
not comply with the provisions of Sections 887 and 900. However, the opinion
of Allen, J., declared that Section 887 "was evidently intended to permit a
judgment in personam to be rendered against a domestic corporation upon service
beyond the limits of this State; but in so far as it purports to authorize the
rendition of a personal judgment upon extraterritorial service, it is utterly void.
[See Moss v. Fitch, supra; Wilson v. Railroad, 108 Mo. 588, 18 S. W. 286]." 44
It is submitted that this view is erroneous. It fails to recognize the distinction
between the question whether a domestic corporation is subject to the jurisdiction of the state of -its origin, and the requirement that adequate notice be
given the corporation. Since a corporation is subject to the jurisdiction of the
state of its incorporation, it would seem that that state may confer jurisdiction
upon its courts by any method of service reasonably calculated to give the corporation notice of the action. Such a view is consistent with the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Milliken v.-Meyer. The handing of a
summons to an officer or responsible agent of the domestic corporation, no matter
where it takes place, gives the corporation actual notice of the action. It is
submitted, therefore, that the Missouri statute under discussion meets the
requirements of due process of law.
Some statutes provide that if an officer or agent of a domestic corporation
cannot be found within the state or within the county in which suit is instituted,
service of process may be made upon the corporation by publication in a newspaper. A statute authorizing such service, according to the weight of authority,
is not contrary to due process of law. 45 A Missouri statute authorizes this mode

41. 267 Mo. 340, 184 S.W. 467 (1916). In Baxter v. Continental Casualty
Co., 48 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931), it was held that the Missouri statute
(Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939) § 887), authorizing service outside the state is void. The
Federal Court said: "The Supreme Court of the state has squarely decided the
statute invalid as applied to Missouri corporations. McMenamy Inv. & R. E. Co.
v. Stillwell Catering Co., 267 Mo. 340, 184 S.W. 467."
42. Mo. REv. STAT. (1909) § 1766; Mo. REy. STAT. (1939) § 887.
43. Mo. REv. STAT. (1909) § 1778; Mo. Ray. STAT. (1939) § 900.
44. 175 Mo. App. at 685, 158 S.W. at 433.
45. Clearwater Mercantile Co. v. Roberts Shoe Co., 51 Fla. 176, 40 So. 436
(1906) (the language of the opinion indicates that the decision is confined to
domestic corporations);'State ex rel. Woods-Young Co. v. Tedder, 103 Fla. 1083,
138 So. 643 (1932), cert. denied, 285 U. S. 557 (1932); Ward Lumber Co. v.
Henderson-White Mfg. Co., 107 Va. 626, 59 S. E. 476 (1907) (officers of corporation could not be found in county in which suit was instituted); White & Co. v.
Jordan, 124 Va. 465, 98 S.E. 24 (1919) (following Ward Lumber Co. v. HendersonWhite Mfg. Co., supra). See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 87,
Comment b. But service by publication is insufficient if a better mode is practicable. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S.90 (1917); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1934) § 75, Comment d. In Piggly-Wiggly Georgia Co. v. May Investing
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of service if an officer or agent of a domestic corporation cannot be found within
the state.40 No Missouri case has been found involving this statute. In Baxter
v. Continental Casualty Co.,47 the plaintiff brought an action in a state court of
Missouri against a domestic corporation. The defendant corporation was served
by publication. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to recognize the
state judgment based upon such service because "the decisions of the state have
confined service by publication to judgments and decrees affecting a res within
the state and do not permit judgments in personam to be entered thereon," 48
citing Priest v. Capitian49 and Moss v. Fitch. The two Missouri cases cited by
the Federal Court are not in point because the defendant in those cases were
individuals, not domestic corporations, and the statute under discussion was not
involved. In one case, at least, the defendant was a non-resident individual. However, both opinions contain statements in accord with the decision of the Federal
Court.
Statutes authorizing service upon a designated official, in an action in personam against a domestic corporation whose officer or agents cannot be found
within the state, have been upheld. 50 But the statute must make it the duty of
the official to forward the summons to an officer of the corporation. 53 The Missouri
act regulating motor carriers applies to any corporation operating motor vehicles
for hire within the state. 52 It provides for service of process upon a state
official but does not charge the official with the duty of forwarding the summons
to the defendant corporation. This statute does not meet the requirements of
due process of law.
CHARLES E. RUYLE:

Corp., 189 Ga. 477, 6 S. E. (2d) 579 (1939), the court declared unconstitutional
a Georgia statute which made the plaintiff's knowledge or belief that the corporation had no place of business or officer in the state the only requirement for
service by publication, instead of the actual fact of absence of such place of
business and officers within the state. See also Meadows Independence Mines
Co. v. Knight, 150 Ore. 395, 45 P. (2d) 909 (1935) (where the affidavit for
service by publication did not show what diligence had been used to serve the
defendant personally). Cf. Nelson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 225 InI. 197, 80
N. E. 109 (1906) (service of process by publication and mailing upon a domestic
corporation, the president or authorized officer of which could not be found in
the county in which suit was brought as authorized by statute, was sustained,
although the company had its principal office in another Illinois county).
46. Mo. Rv. STAT. (1929) § 748; Mo. RaV. STAT. (1939) § 890.
47. 48 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931), appeal dismissed in 284 U. S. 578
(1931), on the ground that "since the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
merely applied the law of the state, no question is presented which gives this.
Court jurisdiction of the appeal.")
48. Id. at 469.
49. 236 Mo. 446, 139 S. W. 204 (1911) (defendant a non-resident, and
service outside the state).
50. St. Mary's Petroleum Co. v. West Virginia, 203 U. S. 183 (1906); Berg
v. Associated Employer's Reciprocal & Ins. Indem. Exch., 47 Idaho 386, 279 Pac.
627 (1929) (service upon state official and mailing of copy of notice- to officer of
corporation); Hinckley v. Kettle River R. R., 70 Minn. 105, 72 N. W. 835 (1897).
51. Pinney v. Providence Loan & Inv. Co., 106 Wis. 396, 82 N. W. 308 (1900).
See Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U. S. 13 (1928); Consolidated Flour Mills v. Muegge,
278 U. S. 559 (1928); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 87, Comment b.
52. Laws 1931, pp. 304-316; Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 5720-5738.
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PURCHASE-MONEY RESULTING TRUSTS IN Missouni
In the recent case of Mays v. Jackson,1 the evidence showed plaintiff, desiring to purchase real estate owned by one Pierce, orally agreed with defendant
for the latter to purchase same with money furnished by the plaintiff. Title
was to be taken and held in the defendant's name "until such time that plaintiff
should demand said lands to be conveyed by defendant to plaintiff." Defendant
refused to convey to the plaintiff upon demand. Despite defendant's contentions
that plaintiff's suit was based on an express oral trust which was void due to
2
the Statute of Frauds; and that there could be no resulting trust since it can
never be the result of an agreement, the supreme court in affirming the lower
court's decision held that plaintiff made out a case of resulting trust and even if
there had been an express oral trust, which was invalid and unenforceable by
reason of Section 3104, Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929,3 this alone would not
prevent a trust from resulting by operation of law from the acts of the parties.
The establishment of trusts and the enforcement of trust relationships is
4
A trust is defined as an
one of the ancient grounds of equity jurisprudence.
obligation upon a person arising out of a confidence reposed in him to apply
5
It is said that a trust in
property faithfully and according to such confidence.
real estate exists whenever the legal title is in a person or class, called the
trustee or trustees, and the equitable title is in another person or class, called the
cestui que trust or cestuis quo trust.6 There are two main groups of trusts,
express trusts and implied trusts. The latter is subdivided into two headings,
resulting and constructive trusts. Trusts are called active if the trustee, apart
from holding title, has duties to perform, and passive if the trustee's only duty
7
is to hold title to the property.
The distinction between a resulting trust and a constructive trust is that
the former arises where the transferee was not intended by the person causing
the transfer to be made to take the beneficial interest in the property, while the
latter is imposed when a person holds title who is under a duty to convey it
to another on the ground that if he were allowed to retain it he would be
8
unjustly enriched. Constructive trusts do not arise out of intent, as do resulting
trusts, but exist where defendant is guilty of wrongful conduct as a result of

1. 145 S. W. (2d) 392 (Mo. 1940).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3104, which provides that all declarations or
creations of trust of any lands shall be manifested and proved in writing and
signed by the party to be charged or else they shall be void.
3. Id.
4. Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634 (1914).
5. Bartlett v. McCallister, 316 Mo. 129, 289 S. W. 814 (1926).
6. Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634 (1914).
7. 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 1, pp. 7 and 8. But Costigan,
The Classification of Trusts (1914) 27 HARv. L. REv. 437, 456, says resulting
trusts are the only implied trusts and some of them can only be called implied
in fact by a resort to artificial reasoning.
8. 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) § 440.1. But Costigan, supra note 7, at 452,
says the fundamental reason for enforcing all trusts (express, resulting, and
constructive) is to prevent unjust enrichment.
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9
which the court adjudges him a trustee. A resulting trust may arise in three
cases; where an express trust fails in whole or in part; where an express trust
is fully performed without exhausting the trust estate; and where one person
pays the purchase price of the land and takes the deed therefor in the name of
another.' 0 This last mentioned case is essentially the same as the principal
1
case and is universally called a purchase-money resulting trust. When one person pays for property and takes the title in the name of
another, the parties being strangers to each other, the party who pays the
consideration is said to be a cestui que trust, while the party receiving legal
title is the trustee.' 2 This doctrine is founded on the natural presumption that
the person who supplies the purchase money intends the purchase to be for his
own benefit. 3 It has been pointed out that the acquisition of value in return
14
But where the one
for money paid out is the normal expectation of mankind.'
object of bounty
natural
or
other
child
is
a
wife,
transferred
is
to whom title
presumption
a
contrary
of the payor, the presumption is not only rebutted, but
15
However, strangely enough, where the wife
that a gift was intended is raised.
pays for a conveyance to her husband, the majority of the courts, including
6
The inference of a resulting trust is a
those of Missouri, presume a trust.'
presumption of fact and not of law, is not conclusive, and the burden of prov7
ing a resulting trust rests on the party asserting the trust.'
The Missouri Statute of Frauds expressly exempts trusts, which "may
8
Logically a purarise or result by implication of law," from its operation.'

9. 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 454.
10. 3 SCOTT, TRuSTS (1939) § 404.1.
11. 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra, note 7, § 454.
12. Kelly v. Johnson, 28 Mo. 249 (1859); Baumgartner v. Guessfeld, 38 Mo.
36, 41 (1866).
13. 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 454. See note 17, infra.
14. Harvey v. Ledbetter, 48 Miss. 95, 100 (1873); Stevens v. Fitzpatrick,
218 Mo. 708, 118 S. W. 51 (1909).
15. Thierry v. Thierry, 298 Mo. 25, 249 S. W. 946 (1923).
16. Fogle v. Pindell, 248 Mo. 65, 154 S. W. 81 (1913).
17. 2 BOGEaRT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 454; Ames, Constructive Trusts Based
Upon the Breach of an Express Oral Trust of Land (1907) 20 HAnv. L. REV. 549,
555: There it is contended that before the Statute of Uses (1536), title to most
of the land in England was in feoffees to the use of the owners, and not the
owners, thus it was natural to presume, as the courts did, that one who received
a conveyance on the direction of the buyer from the grantor-seller was to hold
in trust for the buyer. But when uses were abolished by the Statute of Uses
there was no longer any reason for the presumption that the grantee of the
seller was a trustee for the one who paid the purchase money, as the custom of
the country had changed. However, the courts still raise the presumption,
confesses Professor Ames. Costigan, supra note 7: There it is said where
the buyer has the property conveyed to a legal stranger who orally agrees to
hold for the buyer, there is no more room for the indulgence of the presumption of a trust than there would be if the express trust were manifested in
writing; that a constructive trust should be imposed. The author's observations have not been given impetus by the courts.
18. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3105, which provides that when any conveyance is made of lands, by which a trust may arise by implication of law, such
trust will be valid and effective as the same would have been if Section 3104,
which requires a writing, had not been enacted. The effect of Section 3105 is,
in a word, not to require resulting and constructive trusts to be proved in
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chase-money resulting trust would not come within this exception as this
type of trust arises because of the presumed intention of the parties to create
a trust, hence more closely resembling an express trust than one arising by
operation of law.19 But historically it is excepted from the operation of the
20
Statute of Frauds as held in an anonymous case, decided six years after the
21
and practically it is properly
enactment of the original Statute of Frauds;
excepted from the operation of the statute, because, although such trusts arise
from the intention of the parties, the circumstances of the transaction evidence
that intention in place of the language of the parties, hence there is not the
danger of perjured testimony as in the case where the only evidence of intention
is the oral language of the parties. 22 Even if Missouri had no provision excepting such trusts from the operation of the statute, it probably would be
interpreted as excepting such trusts, 23 as to require that such interests must be
in writing would effect their abolition due to their peculiar nature.
Where one person pays the consideration to the grantor and instructs him
to convey to the grantee, the fact that the payor and the grantee make an oral
agreement unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, that the property to be
conveyed is to be held on an express trust for the payor, does not prevent a
24
A majority of the Amerresulting trust from arising in favor of the payor.
ican coirts, including those of Missouri, hold the inference that the payor did
not intend that the transferee should have the beneficial interest in the property
20
is supported rather than rebutted by the unenforceable oral agreement.
Where the grantee orally agrees to hold the land in trust for the payor of
the purchase price, the express agreement is unenforceable due to the Statute
of Frauds. 26 Able counsel, representing the grantee, have argued, upon the
grantee's refusal to convey to the payor, that only when there is no express
agreement can a legitimate presumption that the grantee was intended to hold
for the payor be made; that the express agreement amounts to an attempted
express trust and takes the case out of the category of resulting trusts, and
that the grantee should be granted the right to keep the land, since the express
trust is unenforceable. 27 This reasoning is illogical. 'Its unsoundness lies in

writing. See Scholle v. Laumann, 139 S. W. (2d) 1067 (Mo. 1940), which
interprets Section 3105.
19. Scott, Resulting Trusts Arising Upon the Purchase of Land (1927) 40
HARv. L. REV. 669.
20. 2 Vent. 361 (K. B. 1683), holding where a man buys land in another's
name, and pays money, it will be held in trust for the payor, although no deed
declaring the trust, for the Statute of 29 Chas. II called the Statute of Frauds,
doesn't extend to trusts raised by operation of law.
21. 29 Chas. II, c. 3, §§ 7, 8 (1677).
22. 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 462, p. 1417.
23. 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) § 406.
24. 2 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 441(j); 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra
note 7, § 461.
25. 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 462, p. 1417.
26. Bender v. Bender, 281 Mo. 473, 220 S. W. 929, 930 (1920); Bryan v.
McCaskill, 284 Mo. 583, 225 S. W. 682, 688 (1920); Shelton v. Harrison, 182
Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634 (1914).
27. Bryan v. McCaskill, 284 Mo. 583, 225 S. W. 682, 688 (1920).
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the fact that the agreement of the grantee to convey does not create the trust,
but simply goes to the method by which it is to be executed. 2 8 The payor's equity
29
still remains upon the grantee's refusal to execute it.
The grantee's contention is also unsound for the reason that it would lead to the absurd result that

he could keep the land because he expressly agreed to give it to the payor,
whereas he would be compelled to give the land to the payor if he had made no
such agreement. 30
However, in the case where the grantee verbally agrees to hold in trust for
the payor who directed the land be conveyed to the grantee, and in the case
where the payor directs that the conveyance be made to the grantee without
an oral agreement as to the desired result, there is a slight difference in that
the trust in the former case may be more active than the trust in the latter
case, which exemplifies the usual resulting trust. 31

But this difference is so

slight that it has not justified a difference in result in the two types of cases.
The agreement by the grantee to hold in trust for the payor is regarded by
the courts as identical with the trust which the law would have implied had
there been no agreement. 2 But, where, as in the case of Heil V. Heil,3 3 the
grantee orally agrees to the imposition of specific duties which are carefully
prescribed, it amounts to the grantee undertaking active trust duties for the
payor, thus the court held that it was not a resulting trust, which is passive,
but an express trust which must fail since not proved in writing as required
by the Statute of Frauds.34
The case of Ebert v. Myers 35 is inconsistent with the general Missouri view
that the existence of an express agreement on the part of the grantee to hold
the land in trust for the payor of the consideration does not cause the transaction to be judged as an attempt to create an express trust.36 In that case the
grantor conveyed to the grantee, who was to hold the title for the benefit of the
payor of the consideration, by virtue of an oral agreement among the parties.
The court held that due to the presence of an agreement to hold for the benefit
of the payor, there could be no trust arising by implication of law; that there
was an attempted express trust which failed for lack of written proof.

28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Scott, supra note 19. But see Costigan, supra note 7, where it was
argued if an express agreement is shown, although it is unenforceable, a resulting
trust cannot be raised, but that a constructive trust should be imposed to prevent
grantee's unjust enrichment. Scott, supra, says it is difficult to see why the
oral agreement corroborating the presumption of a resulting trust should keep
such trust from arising.
31. 2 BOGERT, op cit. supra note 7, § 461.
32. Ibid. Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, 169 U. S. 398 (1898).
33. 184 Mo. 665, 84 S. W. 45 (1904).
34. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3104.
35. 9 S. W. (2d) 1066 (Mo. 1928).
36. Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634 (1914); Condit
v. Maxwell, 142 Mo. 266, 44 S. W. 467 (1897).
This is also the view of the
United States Supreme Court. Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, 169 U. S. 398
(1898): "The existence of an express agreement does not destroy the resulting

trust."
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Doubtless, some might try to justify the decision in the Ebert case on the
ground that the grantor conveyed to his daughter, the grantee, shortly before
being sued by creditors, and the payors were his own children who allegedly
canceled debts owed them by grantor as consideration for the conveyance. Although it is apparent from the facts that the grantor was trying to defraud
his creditors, the Missouri court was not justified in overturning the wellestablished rules as to purchase-money resulting trusts in order to hold for the
defrauded creditors. The court should have used some other ground for reach37
ing its result.
An example of an unusual case dealing with the subject is that of Feis v.
Rector.38 There the defendant agreed with the plaintiff to buy in lands to be
sold at public sale, and upon resale by the defendant the profits were to be
divided with the plaintiff who furnished the purchase price. The court held
that if the written contract was not sufficient evidence of a trust, defendant's
denial of the plaintiff's interest in the property supplemented the contract and
was in law a resulting trust. The effect of the decision is to allow the payor to
proceed on a theory of resulting trust if he is not sure his evidence will satisfy
the Statute of Frauds. It would seem more desirable for the payor to rely on
the agreement and the written manifestation of the trust, where the agreement
is in writing, and to ignore the payment of the purchase price, the theory of
his suit being the establishment of an express trust.3 9
If the theory of the plaintiff's case is the establishment of a resulting trust,
plaintiff should allege the ultimate facts from which the resulting trust sought
to be established would arise.40 Such facts are that, in connection with a sale
of real estate, the vendor transferred title to the defendant, plaintiff paying
the purchase price; that defendant refused to transfer the legal title to plaintiff
on demand; and that the deed to defendant is a cloud on the plaintiff's title. 4 '
Even if the plaintiff, in addition to the above facts, alleged the oral agreement
of the defendant to convey to plaintiff upon demand, the Missouri courts would
not rule that plaintiff's petition is fatally defective.' 2 The allegation of the
oral agreement might indicate a theory of express trust, which would be un-

37. The court might have reasoned that there were competing equities,
that of the creditors of grantor, and that of the children (the alleged ceatuis
que trust), and since the former arose first it prevails.
38. 239 S. W. 515 (Mo. 1922).
39. 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 461. Also see Drosten v. Mueller,
103 Mo. 624, 15 S. W. 967 (1891), where written evidence of the agreement
was destroyed by the defendant.
40. Johnson v. United Railways, 247 Mo. 326, 152 S. W. 362 (1912), held
plaintiff need only set forth "ultimate facts," and in construing his pleading to
determine its effect, the judicial function is to construe its allegations liberally.
Mo. Ra-. STAT. (1929) § 764 requires "a plain and concise statement of the
facts constituting a cause of action."
41. Mays v. Jackson, 145 S. W. (2d) 392, 394 (Mo. 1940).
42. Way v. Raby, 49 S. W. (2d) 672 (Mo. 1932). There it was said the
character of the action must be determined from the petition as a whole. Its
substance is controlling, and plaintiff's theory of the pleadings are of little or
no consequence.
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tenable because of the orality, but plaintiff need not adhere to the theory of his
petition if the facts alleged and proved sustain any valid theory.43
The resulting trust of the type under discussion has been referred to as
"one of the mistakes of equity" and "a matter of regret, '44 due to the possibilities of fraud and perjury.45

In an early New York Chancery case the doc-

trine was vigorously criticized. 46 Professor Scott has pointed out that the
allowance of such trusts has led to much litigation and perjury, 47 but, he has
added, "the danger of perjured testimony is not sufficiently great to justify
the unjust enrichment of the grantee which would follow from his retention
of the property." The Missouri courts have adopted as a safeguard against
fraud and perjury the requirement that the evidence that is offered to establish
a trust by operation of law must be "so clear, cogent, positive and convincing as
to exclude every reasonable doubt from the Chancellor's mind." 48
Other objections to the establishment of resulting trust in lands, of the
purchase-money type, is that it usually results in overthrowing formal documents of record and tends to make the title to land uncertain. 49 Also the possibilities of working a fraud upon creditors are increased in that the enforcement of a resulting trust deceives the creditors of the grantee as to the extent of
the grantee's ownership of the property, and the holding of the record title
in the name of the grantee deceives the payor's creditors with reference to the
amount of assets possessed by him.5 0 An answer to the objection that the creditors of the grantee are deceived is found in the argument that there is no reason
to give greater protection to the creditor in this case than in other cases of
apparent ownership. 51 In addition, the requirement that the basic fact of
payment of the purchase price be clearly established, as pointed out above,
52

protects the creditors of the grantee, as do principles of estoppel.

The modern trend has been repugnant to this purchase-money resulting
trust doctrine, and statutes in several states have abolished such trusts. Under
those statutes the grantee keeps the property. 53 At the same time statutes of
one state has abolished it if the grantee will reimburse the payor,64 while the

43. (1937) 22 WAsH. U. L. Q. 251, where the writer discusses Missouri's
conflicting tendencies in the past and points out the present tendency is to adopt
the libertal doctrine of pleading, getting away from the old doctrine of strict
adherence to the theory as originally stated in the petition. The present Missouri rule insists that facts be pleaded to support a cause of action. Then
any theory supported by the facts will be sustained by the court.
44. Lee v. Browder, 51 Ala. 289, 290 (1874).
45. 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 452. See note 44, supra.
46. Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch. 582, 586 (N. Y. 1815).
47. Scott, supra note 19.
48. Parker v. Blakeley, 338 Mo. 1189, 93 S. W. (2d) 981 (1936); Purvis
v. Hardin, 343 Mo. 652, 122 S. W. (2d) 936 (1938); Williams v. Keef, 241 Mo.
366, 145 S. W. 425 (1912).
49. Williams v. Keef, 241 Mo. 366, 145 S. W. 425 (1912).
50. (1940) 12 Miss. L. J. 380-384.
51. (1938) 23 CORN. L. Q. 476-479.
52. Ibid.
53. New York, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. See Ames, supra
note 17.
54. Kentucky. See Ames, supra note 17.
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statutes of two states abolish the presumption of a trust resulting, except in
cases where the grantee actually agrees orally to hold in trust for the payor.55
This latter is most desirable as it prevents the unjust enrichment of the grantee,
while at the same time it does not unduly favor the payor.
The Missouri Supreme Court in the principal case of Mays 'V.Jackson, considers the point as to whether the oral agreement turns the trust into an express
one, and holds that the existence of the express oral agreement confirms the
existence of a resulting trust and does not amount to an attempt to enforce
an invalid express trust. This is the orthodox view and is in accord with the
majority of the courts.5 6 The doctrine of the purchase-money resulting trust,
in general, is a wise one. 57 So long as the courts recognize resulting trusts in
land, a presumption of trust is justified whenever the payor pays the purchase
price and the grantee takes the title upon an oral agreement to reconvey. To
arrive at any other conclusion would "penalize the innocent buyer to the aggrandizement of the unconscionable grantee." 8
CHARLES J. MCMULLIN

55. Indiana and Kansas. See Ames, supra note 17.
56. BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 454, 461; 3 ScoTT, TRusTs (1939)
§ 404.1.
57. Scott, supra note 19.
58. From Ames, supra note 17.
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